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Stress-Caused Heart Attacks
Chester M. Denwicz*
C URRENT STATISTICS DEMONSTRATE that almost any person may
be suffering from some degree of hypertension or arterio-
sclerosis, and that if he enjoys an extended life span, he is
likely to sustain a "heart attack" from which his chance of dy-
ing is great. Cardiovascular disease has, therefore, become an
incident of modern living, and cardiovascular injuries are one of
the most controversial areas of liability in the field of workmen's
compensation. The conflict concerning heart cases, and especial-
ly those related to the "stress incurred," arises primarily from
the difficulty of proving causation. The confusion arising from
conflicting judicial construction of terms such as "usual strain,"
"unusual strain," "exceptional strain," is compounded by the
conflicting expert medical testimony presented in these cases.
Beyond these inconsistencies in both the medical and legal liter-
ature, there is the basic conflict between medical and legal con-
cepts of causation. The descriptive phrase, "stress and strain," as
applied to the exertion allegedly causing the cardiovascular crisis
involved in a particular case may aptly be applied to the incom-
patibility between legal principles and the opinions of medical
experts.'
The general legal view was expressed in Dwyer v. Ford Mo-
tor Co.,2 where the court concluded:
Whatever the precise connotation of those expressions, the
rule governing compensability may be stated in this fashion:
If the effort or strain, whether great or little, was an incident
of the employee's work and either alone or in combination
with disease played a material part in causing, contributing
to or accelerating a heart attack, the attack is compensable.
The opening statements made by Justice Weintraub, in his con-
currence, are indicative of the confusion in this field:
We granted certification in the hope that we could give help-
ful guidance in this troublesome area. I fear we have not
*B.S., Ohio State Univ.; Procedure Designer, U. S. Steel Corp.; Fourth-
year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace Col-
lege.
I Furlow, Cardiovascular Disease in Workmen's Compensation, Lawyers'
Medical Cyclopedia Supplement 581 (1964).
2 66 N. J. Super. 469, 169 A. 2d 499 (1961).
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succeeded. The law is clear enough. The problem is one of
proof.
As a result of this continuing lively controversy a good
many reported opinions at the highest appellate level have at-
tempted to resolve legal and medicolegal uncertainties. Notwith-
standing judicial statements to the contrary, there is some indi-
cation of a trend to provide accident and health insurance for
the heart victim in the guise of workmen's compensation, and to
equate coincidence with causation.3 This trend has not yet be-
come firmly established, however, and case decisions vary. Ag-
gressive and imaginative counsel may still mold the law to their
clients' advantage.
4
Stress as a Causative Factor
The relation of effort to the exaggeration of coronary artery
disease is a highly controversial matter.5 A recent and compre-
hensive study of effort and occupation in relation to coronary
occlusion has been made." The study was a review of experi-
ences over a 25 year period in which detailed data was kept con-
cerning 2,600 patients who had survived an acute coronary oc-
clusion. The study divided activity into 6 categories, including
sleep, rest, mild activity, moderate activity, walking, and usual
or severe exertion. In this group of patients, 70 per cent of the
coronary occlusion attacks occurred when the patient was either
sleeping, resting or engaging in mild activity. Coronary occlu-
sions occurred during unusual or severe exertion in only 1.9 per
cent of the group.
The study concludes that there is no relation between effort,
occupation, time of day, or type of activity and the occurrence
of coronary occlusion. 7
Discussion of these problems necessitates definition of the
terms "work," "effort," and "stress and strain." Occupa-
tional duties require work, effort, or exertion-that is, the
expenditure of energy or power, physical or mental (emo-
tional). Work, then, suggests "toiling to achieve a desired
3 Supra n. 1.
4 Ibid.
5 Mazel, Trauma and Coronary Heart Disease, 5 Trauma (5) 21 (1964).
6 Master, The Role of Effort and Occupation in Coronary Occlusion, 174
J. A. M. A. (Oct., 1960).
7 Mazel, op. cit. supra n. 5.
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goal." The term "stress and strain," however, suggests
"stretching beyond the limits or normal." "Work" implies
a normal physiologic process or activity; excessive effort or
"stress and strain" suggests there is an abnormal response
to this effort, an "injury." 8
Thus, it has often been claimed that heart attacks are not
related to effort because they occur as frequently when a person
is at rest as during exercise. If as many attacks occur during the
eight hours when one is in bed as during the eight hours one is
active, it has been concluded, physical effort has little or nothing
to do with precipitating an attack.9
There is a vital error in this theory. It is not the ordinary
activities to which the individual is accustomed and which he
always has performed with comfort that are hazardous. 10 It is
the more sudden and more violent and more strenuous efforts
that can do damage."
S. A. Levine, M.D., writing in the Atlantic Monthly, 12 de-
tailed in simple language the relation between effort and heart
disease. Physical effort can be harmful once the sclerotic process
has developed. One must realize that a man may have felt well
and been regarded as well by his physician a day or two before
a heart attack because of a silent, undetectable coronary disease.
During this silent period a sudden strenuous effort, such as run-
ning after a streetcar, lifting a hundred-pound case, shoveling
snow vigorously, or any severe unaccustomed physical effort,
can precipitate a heart attack, can cause collapse or even sudden
death. The large number of deaths occurring among men over
50 years of age during or directly after shoveling snow attests to
the fact that strenuous physical effort is a hazard to some people.
To be sure, nothing harmful would have occurred if the hearts
in these individuals had been perfectly normal; but they did not
know, nor could their physicians have known, that they had vul-
nerable coronary arteries until after the attacks occurred.
In other words, unaccustomed, strenuous physical exercise
can be dangerous for some individuals. It certainly can be harm-
ful to those who already are known to have coronary disease.
8 Isaacs, Occupation, Trauma, and Cardiovascular Disease, 54 Annals of
Internal Medicine 229 (1961).
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Physicians, however, for the most part have been highly
critical of the doctrines on which compensability for cardio-
vascular injuries are based and of the medical testimony tending
to establish a relationship between employment and the appear-
ance of cardiovascular disease. Yet, despite criticism by lawyers,
physicians, legislators, some administrators and some judges, the
doctrine of compensability for cardiovascular injuries due to em-
ployment has progressed over the last 50 years. 13
Cases Involving Unusual Stress
Consistent with the view that unaccustomed or unusual
stress may be a causative factor in cardiovascular injuries, many
jurisdictions insist that the exertion be unusual to satisfy the
"accident" requirement of workmen's compensation. Some ap-
pear to apply this restrictive requirement, in practice, at least
primarily to heart cases. 14 A Florida court held that when dis-
abling heart attacks are involved and where such heart condi-
tions are precipitated by work-connected exertion affecting a
pre-existing non-disabling heart disease, such injuries are com-
pensable only if the employee was at the time subject to unusual
strain or over-exertion not routine to the type of work he was
accustomed to performing. 15
On the other hand, an award was affirmed for a steelworker
who sustained a coronary thrombosis while lifting a heavy piece
of scrap, supported by medical evidence that there was a direct
causal connection between the exertion and the attack. The
court reiterated the Illinois rule that there need be neither ex-
ternal violence nor unusual strain or exertion upon the regular
duties of the job provided there is proof that the work was "a
causative factor." 16
Recovery for a myocardial infarction resulting in a perma-
nent disability to a coal miner, was based on medical evidence
that the work "triggered" the attack. The court held that when
the responsive effort demanded of an employee's physical mech-
13 Marcus, Problems of Compensability in Cardiovascular Disease Cases,
498 Insur. L. J. 518 (Sept., 1964).
14 Ibid.
15 Victor Wine & Liquor Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962).
16 Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ill. 2d 32, 185 N. E. 2d
877 (1962).
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anism in order to do his work contributes to a seizure that would
not have occurred at that time except for that effort, however
easy and routine it may be, the resulting disability is in some
degree attributable to the work and is compensable. 17
Compensation was denied for death of an employee from
acute coronary insufficiency, on medical opinion that a heart
attack cannot be precipitated in one suffering from a coronary
insufficiency absent extreme exertion or an extreme added work
load or something above and beyond the line of duty and in the
absence of evidence that claimant had performed work of that
character."'
Effect of Pre-existing Heart Condition
Pre-existing heart conditions of the claimants in some cases
have been held to vitiate the validity of the claim. Yet other
cases have allowed awards where pre-existing conditions were
involved.
An award for death from coronary occlusion was set aside
on appeal because the evidence showed clearly that the decedent
was afflicted with a diseased heart and coronary system which
had deteriorated to the point where it could no longer stand the
load imposed upon it by his regular and usual work. It was held
that his death resulted solely from coronary arteriosclerosis pro-
gressing gradually to the point where it caused his death.' 9
Similarly, an employee afflicted with pre-existing arterio-
sclerosis, who suffered a myocardial infarction following heavy
lifting, was not entitled to compensation where the strain was
normal to the employment.
20
However, compensation was granted for death of a state
highway employee from acute coronary occlusion after engaging
in trimming limbs from a hickory tree, on medical evidence that
this work was a contributing cause although decedent had suf-
fered from cardiovascular symptoms for many years.21
17 Johnson v. Stone, 357 S. W. 2d 844 (Ky., 1962).
18 Williams v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 194 A. 2d 686 (R. I., 1963).
19 United States Steel Corp. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 154 N. E. 2d 111 (1958).
20 Friendly Frost Used Appliances v. Reiser, 152 So. 2d 721 (Fla., 1963).
21 Price v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 155 So. 2d 213 (La., 1963).
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Conflicting Medical Testimony
The inconsistencies in the case decisions may be partly ex-
plained by the conflicting medical testimony presented which
illustrates the controversy present in the medical profession as
well.
An award was denied for an infarction of the myocardium
due to arteriosclerotic thrombosis, by a divided commission.
One physician stated positively that it was reasonable to assume
that the work plaintiff was doing at the onset of his pain was the
cause of his so-called heart attack. The other medical expert
denied any causation and explained that these infarctions occur
on the basis of arterial disease which is not, as far as anyone can
determine, causally connected. He further testified that the occur-
rence is due to the formation of clots in these diseased arteries
and other physiological processes within the body, that there is
no clear evidence as to causation in relation to effort.
22
A finding of the trial court, affirmed on appeal, that claim-
ant's acute myocardial infarction was caused by his strenuous
labor of shoveling rock was based on a general practitioner's
opinion that claimant's exertion had precipitated the heart at-
tack, although a specialist in internal medicine with special
training in cardiology stated without qualification that the work
had nothing to do with the attack.
23
A commission's denial of compensation to a truck driver,
who sustained a myocardial infarction after a period of usual
heavy lifting was affirmed upon the opinion of a heart specialist
that the exertion had no particular bearing on claimant's heart
attack, although claimant's physician was of a contrary opinion.
24
Emotional Stress
A study by Morris25 compared the incidence of coronary
occlusions among bus drivers and conductors in London. He
found that the drivers, although sitting at all times and not
exerting much energy, were under emotional strain in getting
through traffic and had a higher incidence of occlusions than did
22 Warren v. Gelfuso, 188 A. 2d 461 (R. I., 1963).
23 Williams v. Skousen Construction Co., 73 N. M. 271, 387 P. 2d 590 (1963).
24 Joiner v. Farmers Exchange Cooperative Assn., 368 S. W. 2d 547 (Mo.,
1963).
25 Morris, Coronary Heart Disease and Physical Activity of Work, 2 Lancet,
1055 (Nov., 1953).
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the conductors, who climbed and descended the steps of the
double decker buses many times daily.26
In Hamilton v. Transport Workers Union of Greater New
York, Local 100,27 a union officer was notified that he was re-
lieved of his duties pending a hearing upon a charge of dis-
obedience. Upon medical examination two days before the hear-
ing, his physician found acute exacerbation of a chronic bron-
chitis, emphysema and bronchiectasis, and advised him to limit
his activities to three to four hours per day. This advice was
embodied in a letter written by the doctor and exhibited to the
officer presiding at the hearing. The hearing proceeded for about
12 hours. Denied the right of representation by counsel, claim-
ant conducted his own defense and the record of the hearing re-
flects the stresses and pressures he incurred. Claimant's request
for adjournment because of acute physical distress was refused.
When his symptoms became acute, he left the hearing and re-
tired to his room where he was attended by a physician. Sub-
sequently, this "acute episode" was diagnosed by his cardiologist
as a myocardial infarction which competent medical proof re-
lated to "the severe emotional strain" of the trial and found "a
direct result of the stress during the day." The court recognized
that emotional stress in such degree may cause a compensable
accident and disability.
A contra decision was reached in Gordon v. Temple Beth-El
of Great Neck,28 an action to recover compensation for the death
of claimant's deceased husband, the cantor of a synagogue.
While directing a rehearsal of the choir for a period of about two
hours, standing under strong lights which rendered the atmos-
phere oppressive, the deceased husband became involved in an
argument with one of the choir members and thereafter ap-
peared tense. Later, complaining of illness, he was removed to
a hospital where he died the next day of acute myocardial in-
farction. The Workmen's Compensation Board found that the
sequence of events was sufficient to precipitate the coronary con-
dition and hence constituted an accidental injury and awarded
compensation. However, the Appellate Division reversed the
decision and award, dismissed the claim, and held there was no
26 Ibid.
27 21 A. D. 2d 434, 251 N. Y. S. 2d 104 (1964).
28 14 N. Y. 2d 742, 199 N. E. 2d 508 (1964).
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substantive evidence to support the award. This decision was
later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Compensation was affirmed for a salesman who sustained a
cerebral thrombosis after a period of work which involved un-
usual and considerable emotional stress, anxiety and tension
which was superimposed upon an underlying hypertension.
29
The death of 33-year-old director of maintenance and engi-
neering for an airline from myocardial infarction caused by
worry over controversy with company officials about plane re-
pairs was held compensable. The court found that undue anx-
iety, strain and mental stress from work are frequently more
devastating than a mere physical injury.30 Similarly, an award
for death of an employee who had been afflicted with advanced
generalized arteriosclerosis from myocardial infarction following
emotional upset, was affirmed on medical evidence that an emo-
tional upset results in stress upon the heart as much as physical
stress, and that anger may be a precipitating cause of heart at-
tacks, either disabling or fatal. 3 1
However, compensation was denied a business executive
who sustained a cerebral thrombosis resulting in paralysis
caused or precipitated by emotional shock, since the event was
not an "accident" within the meaning of the act, neither physical
labor nor bodily injury being involved.32
Medico-Legal Attitudes
Plainly, the heart cases will continue to be troublesome as
long as some reach the appellate courts on a record in which the
medical testimony is emphatically certain that effort and exer-
tion have nothing whatever to do with coronary thrombosis,
while most such cases are based on the opposite theory.
8
Differences of opinion are recognized in the approaches to
the problem of causation by the medical and legal professions
with regard to the attribution of cardiac breakdown to stress
29 Lobman v. Bernhard Altman Corp., 19 A. D. 2d 931, 244 N. Y. S. 2d 425
(1963).
30 Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N. Y. 2d 209, 176 N. E. 2d
714 (1961).
31 Little v. J. Korber & Co., 71 N. M. 294, 378 P. 2d 119 (1963).
32 Danziger v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 245 La. 33, 156 So. 2d
468 (1963).
33 1 Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, 566 (1959).
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and strain.3 4 In an article by Professor Ben F. Small 35 this
dilemma was well illustrated, when he stated:
A single light bulb may be subjected to a multitude of
abuses and still burn for a thousand hours. Yet, at any time,
a single flick of the switch controlling its energy may light it
for the last time. What caused it to burn out? A scientist
might find cause in an inherent defect or anomaly in the
filament. Another scientist might find cause in wear and
tear, the increasing vulnerability of the filament with age
and use. What about the switch-on? The scientist might
admit that a sudden impulse of energy could be a factor,
along with others, in the result observed, but cause, no.
Only the lawyer would be artless enough to suggest such
a thing as proximate cause or occasionment in the scientist's
mere factor, and with the suggestion he would probably hear
dark mutterings of post hoc propter hoc, or worse.
In a sense, then, the physician speaks of the cause and the
lawyer of a cause; however, the physician recognizes that athero-
sclerosis is a disease in which a great many factors play a part.3 6
The lawyer, on the other hand, would be satisfied with any one
of these factors if it could be shown that it contributed to any
appreciable degree to heart failure, in the case under consider-
ation.37
Medical View
Lawyers, prosecuting or defending the cardiac claim, mem-
bers of boards, commissions, and courts should give careful con-
sideration to the recent,38 Report of the Committee on the Effect
of Strain and Trauma on the Heart and Great Vessels,39 spon-
34 Furlow, op. cit. supra n. 1.
35 31 Tex. L. Rev. 630 (1953).
36 Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia Supplement 590.26 (1964).
37 Ibid.
3s Furlow, op. cit. supra n. 1.
39 Dr. Paul D. White served as chairman of the Committee. Other mem-
bers were Doctors Eugene Clark, Milton Helpern, Arthur M. Master, James
C. Paterson, Norman Plummer, Leo Price, Howard B. Sprague, Meyer
Texon, and Harry Ungerleider; Professors John Thornton and Felix Moore
ex officio; and Attorneys Barnett S. Fox, Harry A. Gair, Paul Gurske, and
Theodore C. Waters. Dean Harold F. McNiece served as a special legal
consultant. Special studies were conducted by Doctors Arnold Engel, Gloria
Gallo, Gilbert Grossman, Michael Lyons, and Sidney B. Weinberg. The re-
port of the full committee, including the reports of medical-pathological
and legal subcommittees, was presented on February 24, 1963 to the Central
Committee for Medical and Community Program of the American Heart
Association, and was published in October, 1962, at 26 Circulation 612.
May, 1965
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sored by the American Heart Association, started in 1953, first
published in 1962, and a minority report in 1963.
The report of the medical-pathological subcommittee in this
report indicated that an important degree of atherosclerosis of
the coronaries is present in approximately 50 per cent of all
males over 45 years of age in the United States. In many cases,
no symptoms in the individual at his customary level of physical
and nervous activity are produced.40 In an unpredictable num-
ber, environmental factors, including usual or unusual effort will
reveal the underlying disease by inducing an imbalance between
the myocardial demand and the coronary flow.
41
It found no method, either clinical or pathological, of deter-
mining the causative relationship between any given event and
typical coronary thrombosis with infarct.42 It does, however,
recognize that coronary insufficiency may be the result of some
factors, with a presumptive causal relationship if clinical or
electrocardiographic evidence appears during the activity of
these factors. 43 Criteria for establishing a relationship of intimal
hemorrhage to effort or emotion were not clear enough for the
majority of the committee to accept.44
The medical-pathological subcommittee recommended in
their report the following: 45
1. Action be taken to improve the quality of medical testi-
mony.
2. In the current absence of acceptable scientific confirma-
tion, heart disease, except in rare instances, shall not be
considered as arising out of employment and that pre-
sumptive legislation affirming causal relationship of heart
disease of any type of employment is unjustified by pres-
ent scientific evidence.
3. That heart failure shall be considered related to physical
or emotional exertion only if the heart failure occurs
during the actual period of stress clearly unusual for the
individual involved.
40 Lawyers Medical Cyclopedia Supplement 590.25-590.44 (1964).
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Dr. J. C. Patterson,46 the only dissenting member of the
committee in his minority report, was of the opinion that the
evidence at hand favors the verdict that unusual physical exer-
tion or emotional stress may be the precipitating factor not only
of acute coronary insufficiency, but of acute coronary occlusion
as well.47 Nor does he consider it proper to reject stress as a
disease-producing entity simply because it has no pathognomonic
pathological pattern. 48  The clinical evidence that links acute
coronary occlusion to stress is circumstantial, but impressive.
4 9
Persons addicted to lives of stress are seven times more prone
to coronary occlusion with myocardial infarction than those with
converse behavior.50
Legal View
The Legal Subcommittee in the report based on an analysis
of the McNiece Report,5 ' and its own judgment, made the fol-
lowing observations with respect to the legal aspects involving
heart disease.
52
Courts have focused on the concept of aggravation in a legal
sense, rather than causation in an etiological sense.53 Cardiac
claims have rarely been compensated, on the theory that they
are an occupational disease, but rather on the basis that they
constitute an accidental injury.5 4 When courts speak of the "un-
usual strain" rule, they are using "unusual strain" as a legal
word of art, which varies in meaning from state to state and any
resemblance to the medical meaning of the words is little more
than coincidental. 55 Courts have made little effort to reduce or
apportion the dollar amount of cardiac compensation awards on
the basis of proportion of disability or pre-existing disease, but
charging the entire disability against the employer.56 There has





51 Heart Disease and the Law (1961).
52 Supra n. 40.
53 Id. at 590.33.
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been almost no tendency by the courts to take a uniform stand
in cardiac cases.57
The Legal Subcommittee made the following recommenda-
tions for the improvement in the administrative and judicial de-
termination of claims involving heart disease: 58
1. Encourage the interpretation and publication by author-
itative medical groups of evidence as to the causative
factors in cardiac disease.
2. Disseminate medical information relating to cardiac cases
to the general practitioner on a broader scale.
3. Educate the medical witness as to his proper role.
4. Diminish the emphasis by commissions and courts on the
language in which medical opinion testimony is couched.
5. Encourage wider use of autopsies.
Conclusion
The basic problem in this particular area of cardiovascular
injuries, therefore, is not one of accidental character, but the
extremely difficult medico-legal question of causation.5 9 The
burden of keeping this class of cases within proper bounds falls
squarely on the expert medical witness and the expert trier of
facts.60
Members of the committee 6 stated the belief that physicians,
pathologists, and lawyers cannot solve the matter of the relation
of acute coronary occlusion to stress and strain, and agreed the
practical answer is to remove heart disease from workmen's com-
pensation and provide coverage in industry by comprehensive
medical care insurance.62 It is clear that workmen's compensa-
tion puts little emphasis on rehabilitation and return of the car-
diac individual to a normal social and economic activity, and it
has been suggested the American Heart Association project a
committee to study the comprehensive health and pension
schemes of unions, industry, insurance companies, and govern-
ment in relation to heart disease. 6'
57 Id.
58 Id. at 590.35.
59 Larson, op. cit. supra n. 33.
60 Id.
61 Supra n. 39.
62 Supra n. 40.
63 Id.
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